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Entrepreneurs face significant non-diversifiable business risks. We build a dynamic incomplete markets
model of entrepreneurial finance to demonstrate the important implications of nondiversifiable risks
for entrepreneurs' interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business
exit decisions. The optimal capital structure is determined by a generalized tradeoff model where leverage
via risky non-recourse debt provides significant diversification benefits. More risk-averse entrepreneurs
default earlier, but also choose higher leverage, even though leverage makes his equity more risky.
Non-diversified entrepreneurs demand both systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium. Cash-out option
and external equity further improve diversification and raise the entrepreneur’s valuation of the firm.
Finally, entrepreneurial risk aversion can overturn the risk-shifting incentives induced by risky debt.
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Entrepreneurship plays an important role in fostering innovation and economic growth (Schum-
peter (1934)). For reasons such as incentive alignment and informational asymmetry between
the entrepreneur and ﬁnanciers, entrepreneurs typically hold a signiﬁcant non-diversiﬁed equity
position in their businesses, and thus bear non-diversiﬁable entrepreneurial business risk.1 For
example, using data from the survey of consumer ﬁnance, Gentry and Hubbard (2004) report that
active businesses on average account for 41.5 percent of entrepreneurs’ total assets. Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) document that about 75 percent of all private equity is owned by
households for whom it constitutes at least half of their total net worth.
Entrepreneurs are both producers and consumers. Like ﬁrms, they need to make invest-
ment/capital budgeting, ﬁnancing, and business exit decisions. Like consumers, they also man-
age household ﬁnance and have preferences for intertemporal consumption smoothing. The non-
diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risk that the entrepreneurs bear from their businesses makes the business
decisions and household decisions interdependent. We integrate intertemporal household ﬁnance
(consumption-smoothing, portfolio choice) with corporate ﬁnance, and provide a utility-maximizing
framework to analyze the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s capital budgeting/investment, capital structure,
and business exit decisions.
We model an inﬁnitely-lived risk-averse entrepreneur who has access to an illiquid non-tradable
investment project. The project requires a lump-sum investment to start up, and generates stochas-
tic cash ﬂows that bear both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. If he chooses to take on the project,
the entrepreneur sets up a ﬁrm with limited liability.
Our baseline model analyzes the tradeoﬀ between inside equity and external risky debt. Our
focus on this tradeoﬀ is motivated by the following empirical evidence. Heaton and Lucas (2004)
document the high concentration of equity ownership in entrepreneurial ﬁrms and the importance
of debt as a source of outside funding using data from the Survey of Small Business Finances
(SSBF). For example, they report that the principal owner holds on average 81 percent of the
ﬁrm’s equity, and the median owner wholly owns the ﬁrm. These ﬁndings are consistent with
results from earlier Fed surveys of small businesses, as reported in Berger and Udell (1998), Cole
and Wolken (1996), and Petersen and Rajan (1994). Using a large data set of public and private
1Bitler, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2005) provide evidence that agency considerations play a key role in
explaining why entrepreneurs on average hold large ownership shares.
1ﬁrms in the United Kingdom, Brav (2009) ﬁnds that private ﬁrms rely almost exclusively on debt
ﬁnancing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid external capital markets, compared to
their public counterparts. Furthermore, Leland and Pyle (1977) show that debt often dominates
equity in settings with asymmetric information because debt is less information-sensitive.
After the ﬁrm is set up, the entrepreneur decides when to default on his debt (if the business does
suﬃciently poorly), and when to cash out by selling the ﬁrm (if the business is doing suﬃciently
well). In addition to the business exit decisions, he also chooses consumption and allocates his
liquid wealth between a riskless asset and a diversiﬁed market portfolio (as in Merton (1971)).
While the entrepreneur can hedge the systematic component of his business risks using the
market portfolio, he cannot diversify the idiosyncratic risks. Moreover, both default and cashing
out options are costly. Therefore, the entrepreneur faces incomplete markets, and the idiosyncratic
risk exposure has important eﬀects on the entrepreneur’s interdependent consumption, investment,
ﬁnancing, and business exit decisions.
While the entrepreneur can hedge the systematic component of his business risks using the
market portfolio, he cannot diversify the idiosyncratic risks. Moreover, exit via default or cashing
out is costly. Therefore, the entrepreneur faces incomplete markets, and the idiosyncratic risk
exposure will have important eﬀects on the entrepreneur’s interdependent consumption, investment,
ﬁnancing, and business exit decisions.
Our main results are as follows. The default option embedded in non-recourse debt allows the
entrepreneur to limit his liability when walking away from his business. Intuitively, the entrepreneur
is long a default (put) option (i.e., a state-contingent sale of the ﬁrm to the ﬁnancier), which is an
insurance to the entrepreneur against the ﬁrm’s potential poor performance in the future. Because
the entrepreneur is exposed to the idiosyncratic risk from his concentrated ownership position in the
ﬁrm, the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of external risky debt are important when markets are incomplete.
The diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of debt are large. Even without the tax beneﬁts of debt, the en-
trepreneurial ﬁrm still issues a signiﬁcant amount of debt. The diversiﬁcation beneﬁts also lead to
a seemingly counterintuitive prediction: more risk-averse entrepreneurs choose higher leverage. On
the one hand, higher leverage increases the risk for the entrepreneur’s equity stake. On the other
hand, higher leverage/debt implies less equity exposure to the entrepreneurial project, making the
entrepreneur’s overall portfolio (including both his private equity in the ﬁrm and his liquid ﬁnan-
cial wealth) less risky. This overall portfolio composition eﬀect dominates the high leverage eﬀect
2within the ﬁrm. The more risk-averse the entrepreneur, the stronger the need to reduce his ﬁrm
risk exposure, therefore the higher the leverage.
The non-diversiﬁable risk and concentrated wealth in the business make the entrepreneur value
his equity less than do diversiﬁed investors. The entrepreneur demands an extra premium for bear-
ing the idiosyncratic risks of the ﬁrm. Thus, compared to a well-diversiﬁed ﬁrm, the entrepreneur
tends to default earlier on his debt. While equity is a call option on ﬁrm assets, and hence is convex
in ﬁrm cash ﬂows, in our model, the private value of equity is not necessarily globally convex. When
risk aversion and/or idiosyncratic volatility are suﬃciently high, the entrepreneur’s precautionary
saving demand can make his private value of equity concave in cash ﬂow.
This ﬁnding has important implications for risk shifting, an agency problem induced by risky
debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that managers of public ﬁrms have incentives to invest
in excessively risky projects after debt is in place because of the convexity feature of equity. In our
model, when the degree of risk aversion is high enough, the entrepreneur’s private value of equity
(locally) decreases with the idiosyncratic volatility of the project. Thus, he may prefer to invest in
a low idiosyncratic volatility project with debt in place, overturning the asset substitution result of
Jensen and Meckling (1976). We ﬁnd that, when the ﬁrm is not in distress, very low risk aversion
is enough to make the entrepreneur prefer safer projects. Our model thus provides a potential
explanation for the lack of empirical and survey evidence on asset substitution and risk-shifting
incentives.
The standard option valuation analysis is no longer applicable to the default and cash-out op-
tions in our setting because these options are non-tradable and their underlying assets are illiquid.
Under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility, we provide an analytically
tractable framework to value these options. We also derive an analytical formula for the idiosyn-
cratic risk premium demanded by the entrepreneur. The key determinants of the idiosyncratic risk
premium are risk aversion, idiosyncratic volatility, and the sensitivity of entrepreneurial value of
equity with respect to cash ﬂow. The dynamic properties of the idiosyncratic risk premium are
quite diﬀerent from the systematic risk premium, especially when the ﬁrm is close to default or
cash-out. Moreover, ignoring the idiosyncratic risk premium can lead to substantial downward bias
in the estimates of the leverage ratio of entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
Finally, we extend our model to allow the entrepreneur to issue costly external equity. The more
external equity issued, the smaller the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic risk exposure, but it also creates
3an incentive problem for the entrepreneur, which lowers the expected growth rate of revenue. We
show that the entrepreneur’s dependence on external debt for diversiﬁcation decreases when he has
access to external equity. Intuitively, external equity is more eﬀective than debt in transferring
idiosyncratic risks to outside investors. The entrepreneur maximizes his ex ante private value of
the ﬁrm by trading oﬀ the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of equity against the costs of incentive problems.
This paper builds on the insight of Heaton and Lucas (2004), who are the ﬁrst to model the
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of risky debt in a static model with asymmetric information (as in Leland and
Pyle (1977)). We study the entrepreneur’s consumption, portfolio choice, (debt/equity) ﬁnancing,
and exit (default/cash-out) decisions in a dynamic trade-oﬀ model. Our model is tractable and
allows for analytical characterization of the dynamics of debt, equity, and the systematic and
idiosyncratic risk premium demanded by the entrepreneur. We also incorporate a range of realistic
features for entrepreneurial ﬁnancing, including taxes, cash-out options, and external equity.
We integrate incomplete markets and diversiﬁcation beneﬁts into the tradeoﬀ model of Le-
land (1994), thus bringing a new dimension to the structural credit risk/capital structure models.2
Our generalized tradeoﬀ model not only applies to entrepreneurs, but also to public ﬁrms with
under-diversiﬁed managers. Our model is related to the incomplete-markets consumption smooth-
ing/precautionary saving literature.3 For analytical tractability reasons, we adopt the CARA utility
speciﬁcation as in Merton (1971), Caballero (1991), Kimball and Mankiw (1989), and Wang (2006).
Our model contributes to this literature by extending the CARA-utility-based precautionary saving
problem to allow the entrepreneur to reduce his idiosyncratic risk exposure via exit strategies such
as cash-out and default.
This paper is also related to the real options literature.4 The closest paper is Miao and Wang
(2007), who analyze the impact of the entrepreneur’s non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks on his
growth option exercising decision. The present paper analyzes the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s investment
and ﬁnancing (internal versus external, debt versus equity), and endogenous default and cash-out
decisions.
2See Leland (1994), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Strebulaev (2007), Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006),
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2008), Chen (2008), and earlier work of Black and Cox (1976), and Fischer, Heinkel,
and Zechner (1989).
3Hall (1978) initiated the Euler equation approach to study intertemporal consumption behavior. See Deaton
(1992) and Attanasio (1999) for surveys.
4See Brennan and Schwartz (1986), McDonald and Siegel (1986), Abel and Eberly (1994), and Dixit and Pindyck
(1994).
42 Model setup
Investment opportunities An inﬁnitely-lived risk-averse agent has a take-it-or-leave-it project
at time 0, which requires a one-time investment I. The project generates a stochastic revenue
process {yt : t ≥ 0} that follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM):
dyt =  ytdt + ωytdBt + ǫytdZt, y0 given, (1)
where   is the expected growth rate of the revenue, Bt and Zt are independent standard Brownian
motions, which are the sources of market (systematic) and idiosyncratic risks of the private business,
respectively. The parameters ω and ǫ are the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility parameters of
the revenue growth. The total volatility of revenue growth is
σ =
p
ω2 + ǫ2. (2)
As we will show, these diﬀerent volatility parameters ω, ǫ, and σ have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
entrepreneur’s decision making.
In addition, the agent has access to standard ﬁnancial investment opportunities as in Merton
(1971).5 The agent allocates his liquid ﬁnancial wealth between a riskfree asset which pays a
constant rate of interest r and a diversiﬁed market portfolio (the risky asset) with returns Rt
satisfying:
dRt =  pdt + σpdBt, (3)
where  p and σp are the expected return and volatility of the risky asset, respectively, and Bt is
the standard Brownian motion introduced earlier. Let
η =
 p − r
σp
(4)
denote the after-tax Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, and let {xt : t ≥ 0} denote the en-
trepreneur’s liquid (ﬁnancial) wealth process. The entrepreneur invests the amount φt in the
market portfolio (the risky asset) and the remaining amount xt − φt in the riskfree asset.
Entrepreneurial ﬁrm If the entrepreneur decides to start the project, he runs it by setting up
a limited-liability entity, such as a limited liability company (LLC) or an S corporation. The LLC
5It is straightforward to consider entering the labor market as an alternative to running entrepreneurial business,
which provides an endogenous opportunity cost of taking on the entrepreneurial project. Such an extension does not
change key economics of our paper in any signiﬁcant way.
5or S corporation allows the entrepreneur to face single-layer taxation for his business income and
makes the debt non-recourse. We may extend the model to allow for personal guarantee of debt to
varying degrees. This feature eﬀectively makes debt recourse to varying degrees. The entrepreneur
ﬁnances the initial one-time lump-sum cost I via his own funds (internal ﬁnancing) and external
ﬁnancing. In the benchmark case, we assume that the only source of external ﬁnancing is debt. See
Petersen and Rajan (2002), Heaton and Lucas (2004), and Brav (2009) for evidence that debt is
the primary source of ﬁnancing for most entrepreneurial ﬁrms.6 One interpretation of the external
debt is bank loans. The entrepreneur uses the ﬁrm’s assets as collateral to borrow, so that the debt
is secured.
We assume that debt is issued at par and is interest-only (consol) for tractability reasons as
in Leland (1994) and Duﬃe and Lando (2001). Let b denote the coupon payment of debt and F0
denote the par value of debt. Debt is priced competitively in that the lender breaks even on the
risk-adjusted basis. We further assume that debt is only issued at time 0 and remains unchanged
until the entrepreneur exits. Allowing for dynamic capital structure before exit will not change
the key economic tradeoﬀ that we focus on: the impact of idiosyncratic risk on entrepreneurial
ﬁnancing decisions.
After debt is in place, at any time t > 0, the entrepreneur has three choices: (1) continuing
his business; (2) defaulting on the outstanding debt, which leads to the liquidation of his ﬁrm; (3)
cashing out by selling the ﬁrm to a diversiﬁed buyer.
While running the business, the entrepreneur receives income from the ﬁrm in the form of
cash payments (operating proﬁt net of coupon payments). Negative cash payments are interpreted
as cash injections by the entrepreneur into the ﬁrm. Notice that trading riskless bonds and the
diversiﬁed market portfolio alone does not help the entrepreneur diversify the idiosyncratic business
risk. He can sell the ﬁrm and cash out, which requires a ﬁxed transaction cost K. The default
timing Td and cash-out timing Tu are not contractible at time 0. Instead, the entrepreneur chooses
the default/cash-out policy to maximize his own utility after he chooses the time-0 debt level. Thus,
there is an inevitable conﬂict of interest between ﬁnanciers and the entrepreneur. The choices of
default and cash-out resemble American-style put and call options on the underlying non-tradeable
entrepreneurial ﬁrm. Since markets are incomplete for the entrepreneur, we cannot price the
entrepreneur’s options using the standard dynamic replication argument (Black-Scholes-Merton).
6In Section VII, we introduce external equity as an additional source of ﬁnancing.
6At bankruptcy, the outside lender takes control and liquidates/sells the ﬁrm. Bankruptcy ex post
is costly as in standard tradeoﬀ models of capital structure. We assume that the liquidation/sale
value of the ﬁrm is equal to a fraction α of the value of an all equity (unlevered) public ﬁrm, A(y).
The remaining fraction (1 − α) is lost due to bankruptcy costs. We also assume that absolute
priority is enforced, and abstract away from any ex post renegotiation between the lender and the
entrepreneur.
Before the entrepreneur can sell the ﬁrm, he needs to retire the ﬁrm’s debt obligation at par
F0. We make the standard assumption that the buyer is well diversiﬁed. He will optimally relever
the ﬁrm as in the complete-markets model of Leland (1994). The value of the ﬁrm after sale is the
value of an optimally levered public ﬁrm, V ∗(y).
After the entrepreneur exits from his business (through default or cash-out), he “retires” and
lives on his ﬁnancial income. He then faces a standard complete-markets consumption and portfolio
choice problem.7
Taxes We consider a simple tax environment. The entrepreneurial ﬁrm pays taxes on his business
proﬁts at rate τe. When τe > 0, issuing debt has the beneﬁt of shielding part of the entrepreneur’s
business proﬁts from taxes. For a public ﬁrm, the eﬀective marginal tax rate is τm. Unlike the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm, the public ﬁrm is subject to double taxation (at the corporate and individual
levels), and τm captures the net tax rate (following Miller (1977)). Finally, τg denotes the tax
rate on the capital gains upon sale. Naturally, higher capital gain taxes will delay the timing of
cash-out.
Entrepreneur’s objective The entrepreneur derives utility from consumption {ct : t ≥ 0} ac-







where δ > 0 is the entrepreneur’s subjective discount rate and u(·) is an increasing and concave
function. The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize his lifetime utility by optimally choosing
consumption (ct), ﬁnancial portfolio (φt), and whether to start his business. If he starts his business,
he also chooses the ﬁnancing structure of the ﬁrm (coupon b), and the subsequent timing decisions
of default and cash-out (Td,Tu).
7Extending our model to allow for sequential rounds of entrepreneurial activities will complicate our analysis. We
leave this extension for future research.
7In general, incomplete markets imply that the entrepreneur cannot fully diversify his business
risk and hence cannot fully separate his investment from consumption decisions. Indeed, provided
that u′(c) is convex, the entrepreneur’s precautionary motive will determine his intertemporal
consumption smoothing.8
3 Model solution
First, in Section III.A, we report the complete-markets solution for ﬁrm value and ﬁnancing de-
cisions when the ﬁrm is owned by diversiﬁed investors. Then, we analyze the entrepreneur’s in-
terdependent consumption/saving, portfolio choice, default, and initial investment and ﬁnancing
decisions. The complete-markets solution of Section III.A serves as a natural benchmark for us to
analyze the impact of non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risk on entrepreneurial investment, ﬁnancing
and valuation.
3.1 Complete-markets ﬁrm valuation and ﬁnancing policy
Consider a public ﬁrm owned by diversiﬁed investors. Because equityholders internalize the beneﬁts
and costs of debt issuance, they will choose the ﬁrm’s debt policy to maximize ex ante ﬁrm value
by trading oﬀ the tax beneﬁts of debt against bankruptcy and agency costs. The results in this
case are well-known.9 In Appendix A, we provide the after-tax value of an unlevered public ﬁrm
A(y) in equation (A.19), and the after-tax value of a public levered ﬁrm V ∗(y) in equation (A.21).
Next, we turn to analyze the entrepreneur’s decision problem before he exits from his business.
3.2 Entrepreneur’s problem
The signiﬁcant lack of diversiﬁcation invalidates the standard ﬁnance textbook valuation analysis for
ﬁrms owned by diversiﬁed investors. As a result, the standard two-step complete-markets (Arrow-
Debreu) analysis10 (i.e., ﬁrst value maximization and then optimal consumption allocation) no
longer applies. This non-separability between value maximization and consumption smoothing has
important implications for real economic activities (e.g., investment and capital budgeting) and the
valuation of claims that an entrepreneur issues to ﬁnance his investment activities.
8Leland (1968) is among the earliest studies on precautionary saving models. Kimball (1990) links the degree of
precautionary saving to the convexity of the marginal utility function u
′(c).
9For example, see Leland (1994), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), and Miao (2005).
10Cox and Huang (1989) apply this insight to separate intertemporal portfolio choices from consumption in
continuous-time diﬀusion settings.
8We solve the entrepreneur’s problem by backward induction. First, we summarize the en-
trepreneur’s consumption/saving and portfolio choice problem after he retires from his business via
either cashing out or defaulting on debt. This “retirement-stage” optimization problem is the same
as in Merton (1971), a dynamic complete-markets consumption/portfolio choice problem. Second,
we solve the entrepreneur’s joint consumption/saving, portfolio choice, and default decisions when
the entrepreneur runs his private business. Third, we determine the entrepreneur’s exit decisions
(his cash-out and default boundaries) by comparing his value functions just before and after re-
tirement. Finally, we solve the entrepreneur’s initial (time-0) investment and ﬁnancing decisions
taking his future decisions into account.
Conceptually, our model setup applies to any utility function u(c) under technical regularity
conditions. For analytical tractability, we adopt the CARA utility throughout the remainder of
the paper.11 That is, let u(c) = −e−γc/γ, where γ > 0 is coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion,
which also measures precautionary motive. We emphasize that the main results and insights of
our paper (the eﬀect of non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic shocks on investment timing) do not rely
on the choice of this utility function. As we show below, the driving force of our results is the
precautionary savings eﬀect, which is captured by utility functions with convex marginal utility such
as CARA. While CARA utility does not capture wealth eﬀects, it helps reduce the dimension of our
double-barrier free-boundary problem, which makes the problem much more tractable compared
to constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility.
Consumption/saving and portfolio choice after exit. After exiting from his business (via
either default or cash-out), the entrepreneur no longer has any business income, and lives on his
ﬁnancial wealth. The entrepreneur’s optimization problem becomes the standard complete-market
consumption and portfolio choice problem (e.g., Merton (1971)). We summarize the results in
Appendix B.
Entrepreneur’s decision making while running the ﬁrm. We summarize the solution for
consumption/saving, portfolio choice, default trigger yd, and cash-out trigger yu in the following
theorem.
11The CARA utility speciﬁcation proves tractable in incomplete-markets consumption-saving problems with labor
income. Kimball and Mankiw (1989), Caballero (1991), Svensson and Werner (1993), and Wang (2006) have all
adopted this utility speciﬁcation in various precautionary saving models. Miao and Wang (2007) use this utility
speciﬁcation to analyze a real option exercising problem when the decision maker faces uninsurable idiosyncratic risk
from his investment opportunity.
9Theorem 1 The entrepreneur exits from his business when the revenue process {yt : t ≥ 0} reaches
either the default threshold yd or the cash-out threshold yu, whichever comes ﬁrst. Prior to exit,
for given liquid wealth x and revenue y, he chooses his consumption and portfolio rules as follows:
c(x,y) = r
￿














where G(·) and yd solve the free boundary problem given by the diﬀerential equation:







subject to the following (free) boundary conditions:
G(yd) = 0 (9a)
G′(yd) = 0 (9b)
G(yu) = V ∗ (yu) − F0 − K − τg (V ∗ (yu) − K − I) (9c)
G′(yu) = (1 − τg)V ∗′ (yu) (9d)
where complete-markets ﬁrm value V ∗(y) is deﬁned in (A.21), and the value of external debt F0 =
F(y0) is given in (C.6).
Equation (6) states that consumption is equal to the annuity value of the sum of ﬁnancial wealth
x, certainty equivalent wealth G(y), and two constant terms capturing the eﬀects of the expected
excess returns and the wedge δ−r on consumption. The key is to note that G(y) is the risk-adjusted
subjective valuation of the entrepreneur’s business project. Equation (7) gives the entrepreneur’s
portfolio holding, where the ﬁrst term is the standard mean-variance term as in Merton (1971),
and the second term gives the entrepreneur’s hedging demand as he uses the market portfolio to
dynamically hedge the entrepreneurial business risk.
The diﬀerential equation (8) provides a valuation equation for the certainty equivalent wealth
G(y) from the entrepreneur’s perspective. In the standard CAPM model, only systematic risk
demands a risk premium under the complete-markets setting. Since the systematic volatility of
revenue growth is ω, the risk-adjusted expected growth rate of revenue in the CAPM model is
ν =   − ωη. (10)
10If we drop the last nonlinear term in (8), the diﬀerential equation becomes the standard pricing
equation: setting the instantaneous expected return of an asset under the risk-neutral measure
(RHS) equal to the riskfree rate (LHS). The last term in (8) captures the additional discount due
to the non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risk. Intuitively, the higher the risk aversion parameter γ or
the idiosyncratic volatility ǫy, the larger the discount on G(y) due to idiosyncratic risk. The next
section provides more detailed analysis on the impact of idiosyncratic risk on G(y).
Equation (9a) comes from the value-matching condition for the entrepreneur’s default decision.
It states that the private value of equity G(y) upon default is equal to zero. Equation (9b), often
referred to as the smooth-pasting condition, can be interpreted as the optimality condition for the
entrepreneur in choosing default.
Now we turn to the cash-out boundary. Because the entrepreneur pays the ﬁxed cost K and
triggers capital gains when cashing out, he naturally has incentive to wait before cashing out. How-
ever, waiting also reduces his diversiﬁcation beneﬁts ceteris paribus. The entrepreneur optimally
trades oﬀ tax implications, diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, and transaction costs when choosing the timing
of cashing out. The value-matching condition (9c) at the cash-out boundary states that the private
value of equity upon the ﬁrm’s cashing out is equal to the after-tax value of the public ﬁrm value
after the entrepreneur pays the ﬁxed costs K, retires outstanding debt at par F0, and pays capital
gains taxes. The smooth-pasting condition (9d) ensures that the entrepreneur optimally chooses
his cash-out decision.
Initial ﬁnancing and investment decisions. Next, we complete the model solution by endo-
genizing the entrepreneur’s initial investment and ﬁnancing decision. The entrepreneurial ﬁrm has
two ﬁnancial claimants: inside equity (entrepreneur) and outside creditors. The entrepreneur val-
ues his ownership at a certainty equivalent value G(y). Diversiﬁed lenders price debt in competitive
capital markets at F(y), which does not contain the idiosyncratic risk premium because outside
investors are fully diversiﬁed. Thus, the total private value of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm is
S(y) = G(y) + F(y). (11)
We may interpret S(y) as the total value that an investor needs to pay in order to acquire the
entrepreneurial ﬁrm by buying out the entrepreneur and the debt investors.





Intuitively, the entrepreneur internalizes the beneﬁts and costs of debt ﬁnancing, and markets
competitively price the ﬁrm’s debt. In Appendix B, we show that (12) indeed arises from the
entrepreneur’s utility maximization problem stated in (B.18). Note the conﬂicts of interest between
the entrepreneur and external ﬁnanciers. After debt is in place, the entrepreneur will no longer
maximize the total value of the ﬁrm S(y), but his private value of equity G(y). Theorem 1 has
already captured the conﬂict of interest between the entrepreneur and outside creditors.
The last step is to characterize whether the agent wants to undertake the project. He makes
the investment and starts up the ﬁrm at time 0 if his life-time utility with the project is higher
than that without the project. This is equivalent to the condition that S (y0) > I.
We may interpret our model’s implication on capital structure as a generalized tradeoﬀ model
of capital structure for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm, where the entrepreneur trades oﬀ the beneﬁts
of outside debt ﬁnancing (diversiﬁcation and potential tax implications) against the costs of debt
ﬁnancing (bankruptcy and agency conﬂicts between the entrepreneur and outside lenders). The
natural measure of leverage from the entrepreneur’s point of view is the ratio between the public





We label L(y) as private leverage to reﬂect the impact of idiosyncratic risk on the leverage choice.
Note that the entrepreneur’s preferences (e.g., risk aversion) inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s capital structure.
The standard argument that shareholders can diversify for themselves and hence diversiﬁcation
plays no role in the capital structure decisions of public ﬁrms is no longer valid for entrepreneurial
ﬁrms.
So far, we have focused on the parameter regions where the entrepreneur ﬁrst establishes his
ﬁrm as a private business and ﬁnances its operation via an optimal mix of outside debt and inside
equity. We now point out two special cases. First, when the cost of cashing out is suﬃciently
small, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to sell the ﬁrm immediately (yu = y0). The other special
case is when asset recovery rate is suﬃciently high, or the entrepreneur is suﬃciently risk averse,
so that he raises as much debt as possible and defaults immediately (yd = y0). Both cases lead to
immediate exit. In our analysis below, we consider parameter values that rule out these cases.
124 Risky debt, endogenous default, and diversiﬁcation
We now investigate a special case of the model in Theorem 1 which highlights the diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts of risky debt. For this purpose, we shut down the cash-out option (by setting the cash-out
cost K to inﬁnity, making the cash-out option worthless).
We use the following (annualized) baseline parameter values: riskfree interest rate r = 3%,
expected growth rate of revenue   = 4%, systematic volatility of growth rate ω = 10%, idiosyncratic
volatility ε = 20%, market price of risk η = 0.4, and asset recovery rate α = 0.6. We set the
eﬀective marginal Miller tax rate τm to 11.29% as in Graham (2000) and Hackbarth, Hennessy,
and Leland (2007).12 In our baseline parametrization, we set τe = 0, which reﬂects the fact that
the entrepreneur can avoid taxes on his business income completely by deducting various expenses.
Shutting down the tax beneﬁts also allows us to highlight the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of debt. Later,
we consider the case where τe = τm, which can be directly compared with the complete-markets
model. We set the entrepreneur’s rate of time preference δ = 3%, and consider three values of the
risk aversion parameter γ ∈ {0,1,2}. Finally, we set the initial level of revenue y0 = 1.
Private value of equity G(y) and default threshold. Figure 1 plots private value of equity
G(y) and its derivative G′ (y) as functions of y. The top and the bottom panels plot the results for
τe = 0 and τe = τm, respectively. When τe = 0, the entrepreneur with very low risk aversion (γ → 0,
eﬀectively complete-markets) issues no debt, because there are neither tax beneﬁts (τe = 0) nor
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts (γ → 0). Equity value is equal to the present discounted value of future cash
ﬂows (the straight dash line shown in the top-left panel). A risk-averse entrepreneur has incentive
to issue debt in order to diversify idiosyncratic risks. The entrepreneur defaults when y falls to yd,
the point where G(yd) = G′ (yd) = 0. When τe = τm, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm issues debt to take
advantage of tax beneﬁts in addition to diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. The bottom two panels of Figure
1 plot this case.
The derivative G′(y) measures the sensitivity of private value of equity G(y) with respect to
revenue y. As expected, private value of equity G(y) increases with revenue y, i.e., G′(y) > 0.
Analogous to Black-Scholes-Merton’s observation that ﬁrm equity is a call option on ﬁrm assets,
the entrepreneur’s private equity G(y) also has a call option feature. For example, in the bottom
12We may interpret τm as the eﬀective Miller tax rate which integrates the corporate income tax, individual’s
equity and interest income tax. Using the Miller’s formula for the eﬀective tax rate , and setting the interest income
tax at 0.30, corporate income tax at 0.31, and the individual’s long-term equity (distribution) tax at 0.10, we obtain
an eﬀective tax rate of 11.29%.
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Figure 1: Private value of equity G(y): debt ﬁnancing only. The top and bottom panels plot
G(y) and its ﬁrst derivative G′(y) for τe = 0 and τe = τm, respectively. We plot the results for two levels of
risk aversion (γ = 1,2) and the benchmark complete-market solution (γ → 0).
panels of Figure 1 (τe = τm), when γ approaches 0 (complete markets case), equity value is convex
in revenue y, reﬂecting its call option feature.
Unlike the standard Black-Scholes-Merton paradigm, neither the entrepreneurial equity nor the
ﬁrm is tradable. When the risk-averse entrepreneur cannot fully diversify his project’s idiosyncratic
risks, the global convexity of G(y) no longer holds, as shown in Figure 1 for cases where γ > 0.
The entrepreneur now has precautionary saving demand to partially buﬀer against the project’s
non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic shocks. This precautionary saving eﬀect induces concavity in G(y).
When revenue y is large, the precautionary saving eﬀect is large due to high idiosyncratic volatility
ǫy, and the option (convexity) eﬀect is small because the default option is further out of the money.
Therefore, the precautionary saving eﬀect dominates the option eﬀect for suﬃciently high y, making
G(y) concave in y for high y. The opposite is true for low y, where the convexity eﬀect dominates.
14Table 1: Capital Structure of Entrepreneurial Firms: Debt financing only.
This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur only has access to debt ﬁnancing
and no option to cash out. The parameters are reported in Section IV. The initial revenue is y0 = 1.
We report results for two business income tax rates (τe = 0%,11.29% (τm)) and three levels of risk
aversion. The case “γ → 0” corresponds to the complete-markets (Leland) model.
public private private private credit 10-yr default
coupon debt equity ﬁrm leverage (%) spread (bp) probability (%)
b F0 G0 S0 L0 CS pd(10)
τe = 0
γ → 0 0.00 0.00 33.33 33.33 0.0 0 0.0
γ = 1 0.31 8.28 14.39 22.68 36.5 72 0.4
γ = 2 0.68 14.66 5.89 20.55 71.3 166 12.1
τe = τm
γ → 0 0.35 9.29 20.83 30.12 30.9 75 0.3
γ = 1 0.68 14.85 7.02 21.86 67.9 159 9.5
γ = 2 0.85 16.50 3.77 20.27 81.4 213 22.3
The precautionary saving eﬀect also causes a more risk-averse entrepreneur to discount cash
ﬂows at a higher rate. For a given level of coupon b, the entrepreneur values his inside equity
lower (smaller G(y)), thus is more willing to default and walk away. Moreover, a more risk-averse
entrepreneur also has a stronger incentive to diversify idiosyncratic risks by selling a bigger share
of his ﬁrm, which implies a larger coupon b, a higher default threshold, and a higher debt value,
ceteris paribus. The two eﬀects reinforce each other. Figure 1 conﬁrms that both G(y) and the
default threshold yd increase with risk aversion γ.
Capital structure for entrepreneurial ﬁrms. First, we consider the special case where risky
debt only oﬀers diversiﬁcation beneﬁts for the entrepreneur and has no tax beneﬁts (τe = 0). Then,
we incorporate the tax beneﬁts of debt into our analysis.
The top panel in Table 1 provides results for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s capital structure when
τe = 0. If the entrepreneur is very close to being risk neutral (γ → 0), the model’s prediction is
essentially the same as the complete-market benchmark. In this case, the standard tradeoﬀ theory
of capital structure implies that the entrepreneurial ﬁrm will be entirely ﬁnanced by equity (since
debt provides no beneﬁts). The risk-neutral entrepreneur values the ﬁrm at its market value 33.33.
15For γ = 1, the entrepreneur borrows F0 = 8.28 in market value with coupon b = 0.31, and values
his non-tradable equity G0 at 14.39, giving the private value of the ﬁrm S0 = 22.68. The drop in S0
is substantial (from 33.33 to 22.68, or about 32%) when increasing γ from zero to one. This drop
in S0 is mainly due to the risk-averse entrepreneur’s discount of his non-tradable equity position
for bearing non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic business risks. The default risk of debt contributes little
to the reduction of S0 (the 10-year cumulative default probability rises from 0 to 0.4% only).
In Section III, we introduced the natural measure of leverage for entrepreneurial ﬁrms: private
leverage L0, given by the ratio of public debt value F0 to private value of the ﬁrm S0. Private
leverage L0 naturally arises from the entrepreneur’s maximization problem and captures the en-
trepreneur’s tradeoﬀ between private value of equity and public value of debt in choosing debt
coupon policy. For γ = 1, the private leverage ratio is about 36.5%.
With a higher risk aversion level γ = 2, the entrepreneur borrows more (F0 = 14.66) with a
higher coupon (b = 0.68). He values his remaining non-tradable equity at G0 = 5.89, and the
implied private leverage ratio L0 = 71.3% is much higher than 36.5%, the value for γ = 1. The
more risk-averse entrepreneur takes on more leverage, because he has stronger incentive to sell more
of the ﬁrm to achieve greater diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. With greater risk aversion, default is more
likely (the 10-year cumulative default probability is 12.1%), and the credit spread is higher (166
basis points over the riskfree rate).
Next, we incorporate the eﬀect of tax beneﬁts for the entrepreneur into our generalized tradeoﬀ
model of capital structure for entrepreneurial ﬁrms. To compare with the complete-markets bench-
mark, we set τe = τm = 11.29%. Therefore, the only diﬀerence between an entrepreneurial ﬁrm
and a public ﬁrm is that the entrepreneur faces non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks.
The ﬁrst row of the lower panel of Table 1 gives the results for the complete-markets benchmark.
Facing positive corporate tax rates, the public ﬁrm wants to issue debt, but is also concerned with
bankruptcy costs. The optimal tradeoﬀ for the public ﬁrm is to issue debt at the competitive
market value F0 = 9.29 with coupon b = 0.35. The implied initial leverage is 30.9% and the 10-year
cumulative default probability is tiny (0.3%).
Similar to the case with τe = 0, an entrepreneur facing non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks
wants to issue more risky debt to diversify these risks. The second panel of Table 1 shows that the
entrepreneur with γ = 1 borrows 14.85 (with the coupon rate b = 0.68), higher than the level for the
public ﬁrm. The private leverage more than doubles to 67.9%. Not surprisingly, the entrepreneur
16Table 2: Decomposition of Private Leverage for Entrepreneurial Firms
This table compares a private ﬁrm owned by a risk-averse entrepreneur with a public ﬁrm. There
is no option to cash out. We assume τe = τm, while the rest of the parameters are reported in
Section IV. All the results are for initial revenue y0 = 1.
10-yr default public equity ﬁrm ﬁnancial credit
probability (%) debt value value leverage (%) spread (bp)
pd(10) F0 G0 S0 L0 CS
γ = 2 (b = 0.85, yd = 0.47) 22.3 16.50 3.77 20.27 81.4 213
Public (b = 0.85, yd = 0.47) 22.3 16.50 11.10 27.60 59.8 213
Public (b = 0.85, yd = 0.35) 9.8 17.71 11.56 29.26 60.5 178
Public (b = 0.35, yd = 0.14) 0.3 9.29 20.82 30.11 30.9 75
faces a higher default probability and the credit spread of his debt is also higher. With γ = 2, debt
issuance increases to 16.50, and private leverage increases to 81.4%.
Determinants of capital structure decisions. To further demonstrate the important role of
idiosyncratic risks in determining the capital structure of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, we now turn to two
comparisons.
First, consider an econometrician who has correctly identiﬁed the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s debt
coupon b = 0.85 and default threshold yd = 0.47, but does not realize that the entrepreneur’s
subjective valuation G(y;b,yd) is lower than the corresponding public equity value E(y;b,yd) due
to non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risk. Indeed, he assigns the entrepreneur’s equity with a value
at E0 = 11.10 instead of the subjective valuation G0 = 3.77, thus obtaining a leverage ratio of
59.8%, substantially lower than the entrepreneur’s private leverage L0 = 81.4%. The large diﬀer-
ence between the private and market leverage ratios highlights the economic signiﬁcance of taking
idiosyncratic risks into account. Simply put, standard corporate ﬁnance methodology potentially
underestimates the leverage of entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
Second, we highlight the impact of the entrepreneur’s endogenous default decision. The pub-
lic and the entrepreneurial ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent leverage decisions because both debt
issuance and default decisions on debt (given the same level of debt coupon outstanding) are dif-
ferent. To see the quantitative eﬀects of endogenous default decisions on leverage, we hold the
coupon rate on outstanding debt ﬁxed. That is, consider a public ﬁrm that has the same technol-
ogy/environment parameters as the entrepreneurial ﬁrm. Moreover, the two ﬁrms have the same
17debt coupons (b = 0.85).
Facing the same coupon b = 0.85, the public ﬁrm defaults when revenue reaches the default
threshold yd = 0.35, which is lower than the threshold yd = 0.47 for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm.
Intuitively, facing the same coupon b, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm defaults earlier than the public ﬁrm
because of the entrepreneur’s aversion to non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risk. The implied shorter
distance-to-default for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm translates into a higher 10-year default probability
(22% for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm versus 10% for the public ﬁrm) and a higher credit spread (213
basis points for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm versus 178 basis points for the public ﬁrm). Defaulting
optimally for the public ﬁrm raises its value from S0 = 27.60 to S0 = 29.26.
The preceding two comparisons help explain the diﬀerences in leverage ratios between the en-
trepreneurial ﬁrm and the public ﬁrm. First, ﬁxing both the coupon and the default threshold, the
entrepreneur’s subjective valuation (due to non-diversiﬁable risks) has signiﬁcant impact on the im-
plied leverage ratio. Ignoring subjective valuation substantially underestimates the entrepreneurial
ﬁrm’s leverage. Second, facing the same coupon, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm defaults earlier than the
public ﬁrm, which reduces the value of debt and lowers the leverage ratio, but the quantitative eﬀect
seems small. Third, diversiﬁcation motives make the entrepreneur issue more debt than the public
ﬁrm, which further raises the leverage ratio of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm. While the numerical results
are parameter speciﬁc, the analysis provides support for our intuition that the entrepreneur’s need
for diversiﬁcation and subjective valuation discount for bearing non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks
are key determinants of the private leverage for an entrepreneurial ﬁrm.
5 Cash-out option as an alternative channel of diversiﬁcation
We now turn to a richer and more realistic setting where the entrepreneur can diversify idiosyncratic
risks through both the default and cash-out options. The entrepreneur avoids the downside risk
by defaulting if the ﬁrm’s stochastic revenue falls to a suﬃciently low level. In addition, when the
ﬁrm does well enough, the entrepreneur may want to capitalize on the upside by selling the ﬁrm to
diversiﬁed investors.
In addition to the baseline parameter values from Section IV, we set the eﬀective capital gains
tax rate from selling the business τg = 10%, reﬂecting the tax deferral advantage of the tax timing
option.13 We set the initial investment cost for the project I = 10, which is 1/3 of the market
13In Appendix D.1, we investigate the eﬀects of diﬀerent capital gain taxes.
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Figure 2: Private value of equity G(y): debt ﬁnancing and cash-out option. We plot the
results with the following parameters: γ = 1, τe = 0, τg = 10%, I = 10, and K = 27. The remaining
parameters are from the benchmark case reported in Section IV.
value of project cash-ﬂows. We choose the cash-out cost K = 27 to generate a 10-year cash-out
probability of about 20% (with γ = 2), consistent with the success rates of venture capital ﬁrms
(Hall and Woodward (2008)).
Cash-out option: Crowding out debt. Figure 2 plots the private value of equity G(y) and
its ﬁrst derivative G′(y) for an entrepreneur with risk aversion γ = 1 when he has the option to
cash out. The function G(y) smoothly touches the horizontal axis on the left and the dash line
denoting the value of cashing out on the right. The two tangent points give the default and cash-out
thresholds, respectively. For suﬃciently low values of revenue y, the private value of equity G(y) is
increasing and convex because the default option is deep in the money. For suﬃciently high values
of y, G(y) is also increasing and convex because the cash-out option is deep in the money. For
revenue y in the intermediate range, neither default nor cash-out option is deep in the money. In
this range, the precautionary saving motive may be large enough to induce concavity. As shown in
the right panel of Figure 1, G′ (y) ﬁrst increases for low values of y, then decreases for intermediate
values of y, and ﬁnally increases for high values of y.
Table 3 provides the capital structure information of an entrepreneurial ﬁrm with both cash-
out and default options. For brevity, we only report the results for the case τe = τm. When the
market is complete, the ﬁrm’s cash-out option is essentially an option to adjust the ﬁrm’s capital
19Table 3: Capital Structure of Entrepreneurial Firms: debt financing and cash-out
option
This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has access to both public debt
ﬁnancing and cash-out option to exit from his project. The parameters are: I = 10, K = 27,
τe = τm = 11.29%, τg = 10%, and y0 = 1. The rest of the parameters are from the benchmark case
in Section IV.
public private private private 10-yr default 10-yr cash-out
coupon debt equity ﬁrm leverage (%) prob (%) prob (%)
b F0 G0 S0 L0 pd(10) pu(10)
γ → 0 0.35 9.29 20.83 30.12 30.9 0.3 0.0
γ = 1 0.55 12.45 9.57 22.02 56.5 4.2 12.3
γ = 2 0.66 13.68 6.24 19.92 68.7 10.1 23.3
structure (recall that there is no diversiﬁcation beneﬁt for public ﬁrms). In this case, given our
calibrated ﬁxed cost K, the 10-year cash-out probability is essentially zero and hence this option
value is close to zero for the public ﬁrm. Therefore, we expect that the bulk of the cash-out option
value for entrepreneurial ﬁrms comes from the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, not from the option value of
readjusting leverage.
For a risk-averse entrepreneur, the prospect of cashing out lowers the ﬁrm’s incentive to issue
debt. When γ = 1, debt coupon is b = 0.55, lower than the level b = 0.68 for the ﬁrm which only
has the default option. The private leverage ratio L0 at issuance is 56.5%, with a credit spread
at 138 basis points, compared to the private leverage ratio L0 = 67.9% and credit spread of 159
basis points when the ﬁrm only has the default option. The 10-year default probability is close
to zero, but the 10-year cash-out probability is 12.3%, which is economically signiﬁcant (recall
that the 10-year cash-out probability for a public ﬁrm is zero). For more risk averse entrepreneurs
(e.g., γ = 2), the private leverage ratio is 68.7%, smaller than 81.4% for the setting without the
cash-out option. Given the opportunity to sell his business to public investors, the entrepreneur
substitutes away from risky debt and relies more on the future potential of cashing out to diversify
his idiosyncratic risks.
Idiosyncratic risk, leverage, and risk premium. We now turn to the impact of idiosyncratic
volatility on leverage and risk premium. Figure 3 shows its eﬀect on leverage. In complete-markets
models, an increase in (idiosyncratic) volatility ǫ raises default risk, hence the market leverage
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Figure 3: Comparative statics – optimal coupon and private leverage with respect to
idiosyncratic volatilities ǫ: the case of debt and cash-out option. The two panels plot the
optimal coupon b and the corresponding optimal private leverage L0 at y0 = 1. In each case, we plot the
results for two levels of risk aversion (γ = 1,2) alongside the benchmark complete-market solution (γ → 0).
The remaining parameters are the same as in Table 3.
ratio and the coupon rate for the public ﬁrm decrease with idiosyncratic volatility. By contrast,
risk-averse entrepreneurs take on more debt to diversify their idiosyncratic risks when ǫ is higher.
For γ = 1, both coupon and leverage become monotonically increasing in ǫ. This result implies
that the private leverage ratio for entrepreneurial ﬁrms increases with idiosyncratic volatility even
for mild risk aversion.
For public ﬁrms, risk premium is determined by the ﬁrm’s non-diversiﬁable systematic risk.
For entrepreneurial ﬁrm, both systematic and idiosyncratic risks matter for the ﬁrm’s investment
decisions. Without loss of generality, we decompose the entrepreneur’s risk premium into two com-
ponents: the systematic risk premium πs(y) and the idiosyncratic risk premium πi(y). Rearranging















The systematic risk premium πs(y) deﬁned in (14) takes the same form as in standard asset
pricing models. It is the product of the (market) Sharpe ratio η, systematic volatility ω, and the
elasticity of G(y) with respect to y, where the elasticity captures the impact of optionality on the




















































Figure 4: Systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium. This ﬁgure plots the systematic and
idiosyncratic risk premium for entrepreneurial ﬁrms. The top panels plot the results for two levels of risk
aversion(γ = 2,4). The bottom panels plot the results for two levels of idiosyncratic volatility (ǫ = 0.20,0.25).
We assume γ = 2 (when changing ǫ), ǫ = 0.2 (when changing γ). The remaining parameters are the same
as in Table 3.
risk premium.14
Unlike πs(y), the idiosyncratic risk premium πi(y) deﬁned in (15) directly depends on risk
aversion γ and (ǫyG′(y))
2, the conditional (idiosyncratic) variance of the entrepreneur’s equity
G(y). The conditional (idiosyncratic) variance term reﬂects the fact that the idiosyncratic risk
premium πi(y) is determined by the entrepreneur’s precautionary saving demand, which depends
on the conditional variance of idiosyncratic risks (Caballero (1991) and Wang (2006)).
We examine the behavior of these risk premia in Figure 4. The entrepreneur’s equity is a
levered position in the ﬁrm. When the ﬁrm approaches default, the systematic component of the
risk premium πs(y) behaves similarly to the standard valuation model. That is, the signiﬁcant
leverage eﬀect around the default boundary implies that the systematic risk premium diverges to
14Despite this standard interpretation for the systematic risk premium, it is worth pointing out that π
s(y) also
indirectly reﬂects the non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks that the entrepreneur bears, and risk aversion γ indirectly
aﬀects π
s(y) through its impact on G(y).
22inﬁnity when y approaches yd. When the ﬁrm approaches the cash-out threshold, the cash-out
option makes the ﬁrm value more sensitive to cash ﬂow shocks, which also tends to raise the
systematic risk premium.
The idiosyncratic risk premium πi(y) behaves quite diﬀerently. Figure 4 indicates that the
idiosyncratic risk premium is small when the ﬁrm is close to default, and it increases with y for most
values of y. The intuition is as follows. The numerator in (15) reﬂects the agent’s precautionary
saving demand, which depends on the conditional idiosyncratic variance of the changes in the
certainty equivalent value of equity G(y) and risk aversion γ. Both the conditional idiosyncratic
variance and G(y) increase with y. When y is large, the conditional idiosyncratic variance rises fast
relative to G(y), generating a large idiosyncratic risk premium.
6 Project choice: asset substitution versus risk sharing
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that there is an incentive problem associated with risky
debt: After debt is in place, managers have incentive to take on riskier projects to take advantage
of the option-type of payoﬀ structure of equity. However, there is little empirical evidence in
support of such risk shifting behaviors.15 One possible explanation is that managerial risk aversion
can potentially dominate the risk shifting incentives. Our model provides a natural setting to
investigate these two competing eﬀects quantitatively.
We consider the following project choice problem. Suppose the risk-averse entrepreneur can
choose among a continuum of mutually exclusive projects with diﬀerent idiosyncratic volatilities ǫ
in the interval [ǫmin,ǫmax] after debt is in place. Let F0 be the market value of existing debt with
the coupon payment b. The entrepreneur then chooses idiosyncratic volatility ǫ+ ∈ [ǫmin,ǫmax]
to maximize his own utility. As shown in Section III, the entrepreneur eﬀectively chooses ǫ+ to
maximize his private value of equity G(y0), taking the debt contract (b,F0) as given. Let this
maximized value be G+ (y0).
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the lender anticipates the entrepreneur’s ex post incentive
of choosing the level of idiosyncratic volatility ǫ+ to maximize G(y0), and prices the initial debt
contract accordingly in competitive capital markets. Therefore, the entrepreneur ex ante maximizes
the private value of the ﬁrm, S(y0) = G+(y0)+F0, taking the competitive market debt pricing into
account. We solve this joint investment and ﬁnancing (ﬁxed-point) problem.
15See Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Graham and Harvey (2001), and Rauh (2008), among others.
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Figure 5: Private equity value as function of idiosyncratic volatility after optimal debt
is in place. This ﬁgure plots the private value of equity for diﬀerent choices of idiosyncratic volatility
ǫ after debt issuance. The coupon is ﬁxed at the optimal value corresponding to given risk aversion. We
assume ǫmin = 0.05, ǫmax = 0.35. The remaining parameters are the same as in Table 3.
Figure 5 illustrates the solution of this optimization problem. We set ǫmin = 0.05,ǫmax = 0.35.
When γ → 0, the entrepreneur chooses the highest idiosyncratic volatility project with ǫmax = 0.35.
The optimal coupon payment is 0.297. In this case, the entrepreneur eﬀectively faces complete
markets. The Jensen and Meckling (1976) argument applies because the market value of equity
is convex and the ex post risk shifting problem arises. When the entrepreneur is risk averse, he
demands a premium for bearing the non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks, which tends to lower his
private value of equity G(y0). When this eﬀect dominates, the entrepreneur prefers projects with
lower idiosyncratic volatility. For example, for γ = 1, the entrepreneur chooses the project with
ǫmin = 0.05, with the corresponding optimal coupon payment 0.491. Even when the degree of risk
aversion is low (e.g., γ = 0.1, which implies an idiosyncratic risk premium of 2 basis points for
ǫ = 0.05, or 20 basis points for ǫ = 0.20), we still ﬁnd that the risk aversion eﬀect dominates the
risk shifting incentive.
From this numerical example, we ﬁnd that in our model, even with low risk aversion, the
precautionary saving incentive tends to dominate the asset substitution incentive in normal times.
Note that our argument applies to public ﬁrms as well, provided that: (i) managerial compensation
is tied to ﬁrm performance; (ii) managers are not fully diversiﬁed, behave in their own interests,
24and are entrenched. Thus, the lack of empirical evidence supporting asset substitution may be
simply due to the non-diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks faced by risk-averse decision makers.
7 External equity
While debt is the primary source of ﬁnancing for most entrepreneurial (small-business) ﬁrms, high-
tech startups are often ﬁnanced by venture capital, which often use external equity in various forms
as the primary source of ﬁnancing. This ﬁnancing choice particularly makes sense when the liquida-
tion value of ﬁrm’s assets is low (e.g., computer software ﬁrms), and incentive alignments are more
important. Hall and Woodward (2008) provide a quantitative analysis for the lack of diversiﬁcation
of venture-capital-backed entrepreneurial ﬁrms. In this section, we extend the baseline model of
Section II by allowing the entrepreneur to issue external equity at t = 0, and study the eﬀect of
external equity on the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of risky debt.16
If it is costless to issue external equity, a risk-averse entrepreneur will want to sell the entire
ﬁrm to the VC right away. We motivate the costs of external equity through the agency problems
of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Intuitively, the more concentrated the entrepreneur’s ownership is,
the better incentive alignment (Berle and Means (1931) and Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Let ψ
denote the fraction of equity that the entrepreneur retains and hence 1 − ψ denote the fraction of
external equity. Consider the expected growth rate of revenue   in equation (1). We capture the
incentive problem of ownership in reduced form by making   an increasing and concave function
of the entrepreneur’s ownership ψ (i.e.,  ′(ψ) > 0 and  ′′(ψ) < 0). Intuitively, the concavity
relation suggests that the incremental value from incentive alignment becomes lower as ownership
concentration rises, ceteris paribus.
More speciﬁcally, we model the growth rate   as a quadratic function of the entrepreneur’s
ownership ψ,  (ψ) = −0.02ψ2 + 0.04ψ + 0.03, with ψ ∈ [0,1]. This functional form is chosen such
that the maximum expected growth rate is 5%, when the entrepreneur owns the entire ﬁrm (ψ = 1),
while the lowest growth rate is 3%, when the entire ﬁrm is sold (ψ = 0). The parameters for  (ψ)
are chosen to keep the agency costs of external equity modest so as to highlight the substitution
eﬀect of external equity.
After external debt (with coupon b) and equity (with share 1 − ψ of the ﬁrm ownership) are
16Initial equity issuance together with cashing out can be viewed as a two-step procedure to unload the en-
trepreneur’s private holdings. Gradual sales of ownership, e.g., as DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) consider for large
shareholders, is less applicable for private business owners due to the lack of liquidity, which we capture with the
ﬁxed cost K.
25issued at t = 0, the entrepreneur’s optimal policies, including consumption/portfolio rule and
default/cash-out policies, are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The entrepreneur exits from his business when the revenue process {yt : t ≥ 0} reaches
either the default threshold yd or the cash-out threshold yu, whichever occurs ﬁrst. When the
entrepreneur runs his ﬁrm, he chooses his consumption and portfolio rules as follows:
c(x,y) = r
￿














where (G(·),yd,yu) solves the free boundary problem given by the diﬀerential equation:







subject to the following (free) boundary conditions:
G(yd) = 0 (19a)
G′(yd) = 0 (19b)
ψG(yu) = ψV ∗ (yu) − F0 − K − τg (ψV ∗ (yu) − K − (I − (1 − ψ)E0)) (19c)
ψG′(yu) = (1 − τg)ψV ∗′ (yu) (19d)
where complete-markets ﬁrm value V ∗(y) is deﬁned in (A.21), the value of external debt F0 = F(y0)
is given in (C.6), and the value of external equity E0 = E(y0) is given by (C.10).
Equation (18) shows how the partial ownership ψ aﬀects the entrepreneur’s private value of
equity. A more concentrated inside equity position (higher ψ) raises the last nonlinear term, which
raises the idiosyncratic risk premium that the entrepreneur demands. The ownership ψ also aﬀects
the boundary conditions at cash-out. The value-matching condition (19c) at the cash-out boundary
states that, upon cashing out, the entrepreneur’s ownership is worth fraction ψ of the after-tax value
of the public ﬁrm value net of (1) the amount required to retire outstanding debt at par F0, (2)
ﬁxed costs K, and (3) capital gains taxes. The smooth-pasting condition (19d) also reﬂects the
eﬀects of partial ownership.
Finally, at time t = 0, the entrepreneur chooses debt coupon b and initial ownership ψ to
maximize the private value of the ﬁrm S(y), which now has three parts: inside equity (entrepreneur’s
ownership), diversiﬁed outside equity, and outside debt:
S(y) = ψG(y) + (1 − ψ)E0(y) + F(y). (20)
26Table 4: Capital Structure of Entrepreneurial Firms: external debt/equity and
cash-out option
This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has access to both public
debt and equity ﬁnancing, and cash-out option to exit from his project. We assume τe = τm,
 (ψ) = −0.02ψ2 + 0.04ψ + 0.03, while the rest of the parameters are reported in Table 3. All the
results are for initial revenue y0 = 1.
public public private private private 10-yr default 10-yr cash-out
ownership debt equity equity ﬁrm leverage (%) prob (%) prob (%)
ψ F0 (1 − ψ)E0 ψG0 S0 L0 pd(10) pu(10)
γ → 0 1.00 15.23 0.00 30.07 45.30 33.6 0.4 0.0
γ = 1 0.69 16.00 8.50 8.26 32.76 48.8 3.8 11.3
γ = 2 0.65 15.93 9.50 5.67 31.10 51.2 6.0 15.4
The results are reported in Table 4. If the entrepreneur is risk-neutral, he will clearly prefer to
keep 100% ownership. In this case, all the equity in the ﬁrm is privately held, the private leverage is
33.6%, and the 10-year probabilities of default and cash-out are both close to zero. An entrepreneur
with γ = 1 lowers his ownership to 69%, which reduces the growth rate to 4.8% (only a 0.2% drop).
However, the coupon rises from 0.55 to 0.66, and private leverage rises from 33.6% to 48.8%. The
increase in demand for debt due to diversiﬁcation is economically sizeable, especially considering
that the increase is partially oﬀset by the reduced tax beneﬁt of debt due to lower expected growth
rates. The 10-year default and cash-out probabilities rise to 3.8% and 11.3% respectively. When
γ = 2, the ownership drops to 65%, while private leverage rises further to 51.2%. The 10-year
cash-out probability also rises to 15.4%.
These results demonstrate that entrepreneurial ﬁrms have sizeable demand for risky debt and
cash-out options for diversiﬁcation purpose, even when the agency costs of external equity are
small.
8 Concluding remarks
Entrepreneurial investment opportunities are often illiquid and non-tradable. Entrepreneurs cannot
completely diversify away project-speciﬁc risks for reasons such as incentives and informational
asymmetry. Therefore, the standard law-of-one-price-based valuation/capital structure paradigm
in corporate ﬁnance cannot be directly applied to entrepreneurial ﬁnance. An entrepreneur acts
27both as a producer making dynamic investment, ﬁnancing, and exit decisions for his business
project, and as a household making consumption/saving and portfolio decisions. The dual roles of
the entrepreneur motivate us to develop a dynamic incomplete-markets model of entrepreneurial
ﬁnance that centers around the non-diversiﬁcation feature of the entrepreneurial business.
We show that more risk-averse entrepreneurs use higher leverage for greater diversiﬁcation ben-
eﬁts and default earlier. This prediction holds not only in the baseline setting where the source
of external ﬁnancing is risky debt, but is robust when we introduce additional channels of diver-
siﬁcation such as cash-out option and external equity. In addition to compensation for systematic
risks, the entrepreneur also demands sizable premium for bearing idiosyncratic risks, which increase
with his risk aversion, his equilibrium inside ownership, and the project’s idiosyncratic variance.
Ignoring this idiosyncratic risk premium can lead to a large upward bias when computing the pri-
vate value of entrepreneurial equity. Finally, even for low to moderate levels of risk aversion, the
idiosyncratic risk premium signiﬁcantly weakens the risk shifting incentives (Jensen and Meckling
(1976)) for non-diversiﬁed managers.
Our paper also makes methodological contributions to ﬁnancial valuation and decision making.
This paper extends the standard complete-markets Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing and real
options methodology to settings where investment opportunities are illiquid and not marked-to-
market, and decision makers are not diversiﬁed. Our framework can also be used to value the stock
options of non-diversiﬁed executives or to analyze how these executives make capital structure and
investment decisions. See Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2008) for a recent study on the optimal
exercise policy for an executive stock option and implications for ﬁrm costs.
We have taken a standard optimization framework where the entrepreneur’s utility only depends
on his consumption. A signiﬁcant fraction of entrepreneurs view the non-pecuniary beneﬁts of
being their own bosses as a large component of rewards. It has also been documented that less
risk-averse (see Gentry and Hubbard (2004), De Nardi, Doctor, and Krane (2007)) and more
conﬁdent/optimistic individuals are more likely to self-select into entrepreneurship. We also do
not model the fundamental frictions causing markets to be incomplete and entrepreneurs to be
non-diversiﬁed. We view endogenous incomplete markets as a complementary perspective, which
can have fundamental implications such as promotion of entrepreneurship and contract design. We
leave these extensions for future research.
28Appendix
A Market valuation and capital structure of a public ﬁrm
Well-diversiﬁed owners of a public ﬁrm face complete markets. Given the Sharpe ratio η of the
market portfolio and the riskfree rate r, there exists a unique stochastic discount factor (SDF)
(ξt : t ≥ 0) satisfying (see Duﬃe (2001)):
dξt = −rξtdt − ηξtdBt, ξ0 = 1. (A.1)
Using this SDF, we can derive the market value of the unlevered ﬁrm, A(y), the market value of
equity, E (y), and the market value of debt D(y). The market value of the ﬁrm is equal to the
sum of equity value and debt value:
V (y) = E (y) + D(y). (A.2)
Under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, we can rewrite the dynamics of the revenue (1)
as follows:
dyt = νytdt + ωytdB
Q
t + ǫytdZt, (A.3)
where ν is the risk-adjusted drift deﬁned by ν ≡   − ωη, and B
Q
t is a standard Brownian motion
under Q satisfying dB
Q
t = dBt + ηdt.
A.1 Valuation of an unlevered public ﬁrm
Throughout the appendix, we derive our results assuming that there is a ﬂow operating cost w for
running the project. The operating cost w generates operating leverage and hence the option to
abandon the ﬁrm has positive value. The results reported in this paper are for the case w = 0.
Appendix D.2 provides results for the case w > 0.
We start with the after-tax unlevered ﬁrm value A(y), which satisﬁes the following diﬀerential
equation:




This is a second-order ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE). We need two boundary conditions to
obtain a solution. One boundary condition describes the behavior of A(y) when y → ∞. This
condition rules out speculative bubbles. To ensure that A(y) is ﬁnite, we assume r > ν throughout
the paper. The other boundary condition is related to abandonment. As in the standard option
29exercise models, the ﬁrm is abandoned whenever the cash ﬂow process hits a threshold value ya for
the ﬁrst time. At the threshold ya, the following value-matching condition is satisﬁed
A(ya) = 0, (A.5)
because we normalize the outside value to zero. For the abandonment threshold ya to be optimal,
the following smooth-pasting condition must also be satisﬁed:
A′ (ya) = 0. (A.6)
Solving equation (A.4) and using the no-bubble condition and boundary conditions (A.5)-(A.6), we
obtain


































σ−4 (ν − σ2/2)
2 + 2rσ−2 < 0. (A.9)
A.2 Valuation of a levered public ﬁrm
First, consider the market value of equity. Let yd be the corresponding default threshold. After
default, equity is worthless, in that E(y) = 0 for y ≤ yd. This gives us the value matching condition
E (yd) = 0. Before default, equity value E (y) satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation:
rE (y) = (1 − τm)(y − w − b) + νyE′ (y) +
1
2
σ2y2E′′ (y), y ≥ yd. (A.10)
When y → ∞, E (y) also satisﬁes a no-bubble condition. Solving this ODE and using the boundary
conditions, we obtain





















Equation (A.11) shows that equity value is equal to the after-tax present value of proﬁt ﬂows
minus the present value of the perpetual coupon payments plus an option value to default. The
term (y/yd)
θ1 may be interpreted as the price of an Arrow-Debreu security contingent on the event














(b + w). (A.13)
After debt is in place, there is a conﬂict between equityholders and debtholders. Equityholders
choose the default threshold yd to maximize equity value E(y;yd).
The market value of debt before default satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation:
rD(y) = b + νyD′ (y) +
1
2
σ2y2D′′ (y), y ≥ yd. (A.14)
The value-matching condition is given by:
D(yd) = αA(yd). (A.15)














For a given coupon rate b and default threshold yd, using equation (A.2), we may write the
market value of the levered ﬁrm value V (y;yd) as follows:
















Equation (A.17) shows that the levered market value of the ﬁrm is equal to the after-tax unlevered
ﬁrm value plus the present value of tax shields minus bankruptcy costs.
While y∗
d is chosen to maximize E(y), coupon b is chosen to maximize ex ante ﬁrm value V (y).




we obtain the optimal coupon rate b∗ as a function of y0. We also verify that the second order
condition is satisﬁed.
Now consider the special case without operating cost (w = 0). First, from (A.7), the value of
an unlevered public ﬁrm becomes
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31Substituting (A.13) and (A.20) into (A.17), we obtain the following expression for V ∗ (y), the ﬁrm
value when debt coupon is optimally chosen:
V ∗(y) =
"
1 − τm + τm
￿
1 − θ1 −







Note that this ﬁrm value formula only applies at the moment of debt issuance and will equal to
ﬁrm value when the entrepreneur cashes out.
B Proof of Theorem 1 and 2
Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 2. Thus, we only prove the results in the general case where
the entrepreneur has partial ownership ψ of the ﬁrm.
After exit (via default or cashing out), the entrepreneur solves the standard complete-markets
consumption/portfolio choice problem (Merton (1971)). His wealth follows
dxt = (r(xt − φt) − ct)dt + φt ( pdt + σpdBt). (B.1)
The entrepreneur’s value function Je (x) is given by the following explicit form:




























Before exit, the entrepreneur’s ﬁnancial wealth evolves as follows:
dxt = (r(xt − φt) + ψ (1 − τe)(y − b − w) − ct)dt + φt ( pdt + σpdBt), 0 < t < min(Td,Tu).
(B.5)
17An undesirable feature of CARA-utility models is that consumption and wealth could potentially turn negative.
Cox and Huang (1989) provide analytical formulae for consumption under complete markets for CARA utility with
non-negativity constraints. In our incomplete-markets setting, imposing non-negativity constraints substantially
complicates the analysis. Intuitively, requiring consumption to be positive increases the entrepreneur’s demand for
precautionary saving because he will increase his saving today to avoid hitting the constraints in the future. The
induced stronger precautionary saving demand will likely strengthen our results (such as diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of
outside risky debt).
32Using the principle of optimality, we claim that the entrepreneur’s value function Js (x,y)
satisﬁes the following HJB equation:
δJs(x,y) = max
c,φ














The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) for consumption c and portfolio allocation φ are as follows:



































As shown in Miao and Wang (2007), G(y) is the entrepreneur’s certainty equivalent wealth per
unit of the entrepreneur’s inside equity of the ﬁrm. Under this conjectured value function, it is
easy to show that the optimal consumption rule and the portfolio rule are given by (16) and (17),
respectively. Substituting these expressions back into the HJB equation (B.6) gives the diﬀerential
equation (18) for G(y).
We now turn to the boundary conditions. First, consider the lower default boundary. Since eq-
uity is worthless at default, the entrepreneur’s ﬁnancial wealth x does not change immediately after
default. In addition, the entrepreneur’s value function should remain unchanged at the moment of
default. That is, the following value-matching condition holds at the default boundary yd(x):
Js(x,yd(x)) = Je(x). (B.10)
In general, the default boundary depends on the entrepreneur’s wealth level. Because the




























18See Krylov (1980), Dumas (1991), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for details on the smooth-pasting conditions.
33These two conditions equate the marginal value of wealth and the marginal value of revenue before
and after default.
At the instant of cashing out, the entrepreneur retires debt at par, pays ﬁxed cost K, and sells
his ﬁrm for V ∗(y) given in (A.17). We assume that the shares owned by existing equity-holders are
converted 1 : 1 into the shares of the new ﬁrm. Then the entrepreneur pays capital gains taxes on
the sale. His wealth xTu immediately after cashing out satisﬁes
xTu = xTu− + ψV ∗ (yTu) − F0 − K − τg (ψV ∗ (yTu) − K − (I − (1 − ψ)E0)). (B.13)
The entrepreneur’s value function at the payout boundary yu(x) satisﬁes the following value-
matching condition:
Js(x,yu(x)) = Je(x + ψV ∗ (yu(x)) − F0 − K − τg (ψV ∗ (yu(x)) − K − (I − (1 − ψ)E0))). (B.14)





























Using the conjectured value function (B.9), we show that the default and cash-out boundaries
yd (x) and yu (x) are independent of wealth. We thus simply use yd and yu to denote the default and
cash-out thresholds, respectively. Using the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions (B.10)-
(B.12) at yd, we obtain (19a) and (19b). Similarly, using the value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions (B.14)-(B.16) at yu, we have (19c) and (19d).
Finally, we characterize the entrepreneur’s investment and ﬁnancing decision at t = 0. Let x
denote the entrepreneur’s endowment of ﬁnancial wealth. If the entrepreneur chooses to start his
business, his time-0 ﬁnancial wealth x0 immediately after ﬁnancing is
x0 = x − (I − F0 − (1 − ψ)E0). (B.17)




Js (x + F0 + (1 − ψ)E0 − I,y0), (B.18)
34subject to the requirement that outside debt and equity are competitively priced, i.e., F0 = F (y0),
and E0 = E0 (y0). In Appendix C, we provide an explicit formulae for F (y) and E0 (y).
The entrepreneur will decide to launch the project if his value function from the project (under
the optimal capital structure) is higher than the value function without the project,
max
b
Js (x + F0 + (1 − ψ)E0 − I,y0) > Je (x). (B.19)
C Market values of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s outside debt and
equity
When the entrepreneur neither defaults nor cashes out, the market value of his debt F (y) satisﬁes
the following ODE:
rF (y) = b + νyF′ (y) +
1
2
σ2y2F′′ (y), yd ≤ y ≤ yu. (C.1)
At the default trigger yd, debt recovers the fraction α of after-tax unlevered ﬁrm value, in that
F (yd) = αA(yd). At the cash-out trigger yu, debt is retired and recovers its face value, in that
















































Here, θ1 is given by (A.9) and





σ−4 (ν − σ2/2)
2 + 2rσ−2 > 1. (C.5)
Equation (C.2) admits an intuitive interpretation. It states that debt value is equal to the present
value of coupon payments plus the changes in value when default occurs and when cash-out occurs.
Note that q(y0) can be interpreted as the present value of a dollar if cash-out occurs before default,
and q(y0) can be interpreted as the present value of a dollar if the entrepreneur goes bankrupt













35Similarly, for the outside equity claim, we have the following valuation equation:
rE0 (y) = (1 − τe)(y − w − b) + νyF′ (y) +
1
2
σ2y2F′′ (y), yd ≤ y ≤ yu, (C.7)
subject to the following boundary conditions:
E0 (yu) = V ∗ (yu), (C.8)
E0 (yd) = 0. (C.9)
Solving the above valuation equation, we have that the value of outside equity E0(y) is given by




























The initial outside equity issuance E0 is then given by E0 = E0 (y0).
D Capital gain taxes and operating leverage
First, we analyze the case where the capital gains tax is zero. Then, we extend the baseline model
of Section II to allow for operating leverage.
D.1 Eﬀects of capital gain taxes
In the presence of capital gains taxes with τg = 0.10, the beneﬁt from cash-out falls. Table 5
shows that the 10-year cash-out probability decreases, and the entrepreneur takes on more debt in
order to diversify idiosyncratic risks. However, the quantitative eﬀects are small in our numerical
example. We may understand the intuition from the value-matching condition (9c). At the cash-
out threshold yu, when ψ = 1, the entrepreneur obtains less value (1 − τg)V ∗ (yu), but enjoys tax
rebate τg (K + I). Thus, these two eﬀects partially oﬀset each other, making the eﬀect of capital
gains taxes small. Clearly, if the cash-out value is suﬃciently large relative to the cash-out and
investment costs, then the eﬀect of the capital gains tax should be large.
D.2 Eﬀects of operating leverage
How does operating leverage aﬀect an entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverage? Intuitively, operat-
ing leverage increases ﬁnancial distress risk, and thus should limit debt ﬁnancing. Panel 3 of Table
6 conﬁrms this intuition for the complete-markets case (the limiting case with γ → 0). As the
36Table 5: Capital Structure of Entrepreneurial Firms: Capital Gain Taxes
This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has both default and cash-out
options to exit from his project. The parameters are: r = δ = 0.03, η = 0.4,   = 0.04, ω = 0.1,
ε = 0.2, α = 0.6, I = 10, and K = 27. The initial revenue is y0 = 1. We report results for two
business income tax rates (τe = 0,τm(11.29%)), two capital gain tax rates (τg = 0,10%), and two
levels of risk aversion (γ = 1,2). The case “γ → 0” corresponds to the complete-market model,
where the “cash-out” option eﬀectively allows the ﬁrm to adjust leverage once.
public private private private credit 10-yr default 10-yr cash-out
coupon debt equity ﬁrm leverage (%) spread (bp) probability (%) probability (%)
b F0 G0 S0 L0 CS pd(10) pu(10)
τe = 0, τg = 0
γ = 1 0.11 3.20 19.95 23.14 13.8 32 0.0 12.3
γ = 2 0.42 10.11 10.36 20.47 49.4 115 1.9 24.1
τe = τm, τg = 0
γ = 1 0.54 12.29 9.92 22.22 55.3 138 3.9 15.5
γ = 2 0.66 13.57 6.47 20.04 67.7 186 9.8 26.8
operating cost w increases from 0.2 to 0.4, the 10-year default probability rises from 2.2% to 6.2%,
and the ﬁrm issues less debt. On the other hand, equity value also decreases because operating
costs lower the operating proﬁts. As a result, the eﬀect on ﬁnancial leverage ratio is ambiguous. In
our numerical examples, this ratio increases with operating costs.
Our analysis above shows that risky debt has important diversiﬁcation beneﬁts for entrepreneurial
ﬁrms. This eﬀect may dominate the preceding “crowding-out” eﬀect of operating leverage. Table
6 conﬁrms this intuition. As w increases from 0.2 to 0.4, an entrepreneur with γ = 1 raises debt
with increased coupon payments from 0.59 to 0.62. However, the market value of debt decreases
because both the 10-year default probability and the cash-out probability increase with w. The
private equity value also decreases with w and this eﬀect dominates the decrease in debt. Thus, the
private leverage ratio rises with operating costs. This result also holds true for a more risk-averse
entrepreneur with γ = 2. Note that the more risk-averse entrepreneur relies more on risky debt to
diversify risk. As a result, the 10-year default probability increases substantially from 26.9% to
50.6% for γ = 2. But the 10-year cash-out probability decreases from 23.7% to 22.3%.
37Table 6: The Effects of Operating Leverage: The case of debt financing and cash-
out option
This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has both default and cash-out
options to exit from his project. The parameters are: r = δ = 0.03, η = 0.4,   = 0.04, ω = 0.1,
ε = 0.2, α = 0.6, τe = τm, τg = 10%, I = 10, and K = 27. The initial revenue is y0 = 1. We report
results for two levels of risk aversion (γ = 1,2) alongside the complete-market solution (γ → 0).
public private private private credit 10-yr default 10-yr cash-out
coupon debt equity ﬁrm leverage (%) spread (bp) probability (%) probability (%)
b F0 G0 S0 L0 CS pd(10) pu(10)
γ → 0
w = 0.2 0.35 8.03 16.73 24.76 32.4 132 2.2 0.0
w = 0.4 0.33 6.72 13.40 20.12 33.4 194 6.2 0.0
γ = 1
w = 0.2 0.59 10.94 6.34 17.28 63.3 237 14.1 13.1
w = 0.4 0.62 9.41 3.98 13.39 70.3 356 28.4 13.5
γ = 2
w = 0.2 0.73 11.95 3.57 15.53 77.0 315 26.9 23.7
w = 0.4 0.84 10.48 1.57 12.05 86.9 503 50.6 22.3
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